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Argentine agriculture has undergone significant transformations over the past three decades.  After a long 
period of stagnant production and productivity, starting in the early 1970s, a number of independent but 
interconnected events fostered a new technological cycle that induced rapid growth in cereals and oilseeds 
production.  Zero tillage and the introduction of genetically modified soybean varieties were key elements 
of this change, which has significantly increased global supplies of soybeans, an essential food and feed 
crop.  In the process, it has elevated Argentina to a leading position across agricultural commodity 
markets.   
This transformation was the result of an innovative partnership scheme—involving farmers, 
researchers, extension workers, and private companies—that came together in the 1990s to promote zero 
tillage, a resource-conserving cultivation practice.  This partnership deserves most of the credit for 
increasing the area under zero tillage from 300 thousand to 22 million ha, between 1991 and 2008.  The 
adoption of zero tillage improved soil fertility by reversing decades of soil degradation, created an 
estimated 200,000 new farm jobs, and shocked the agricultural commodity markets with additional 
supplies that helped keep global food prices from escalating.   
This paper reviews the institutional process through which these changes came about.  It goes on 
to estimate the benefits attributable to the adoption of zero tillage, not only to Argentine farmers, in terms 
of increased income, but also to world consumers, measured in terms of savings in food expenditures.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Technological innovation can sometimes have a global impact on production processes.  While some 
technological innovations affect only a few features of production, a far-reaching innovation may affect 
the whole production process or even the organizational and economic logic of an entire productive 
sector—or even of the economy itself.   
Technology is an essential element in both the production processes and the economics of 
agricultural production (Sábato 1971); and technological change—at any level of the production chain—
affects economic interactions among all actors within that chain.  The innovation of zero-till farming had 
far-reaching effects on Argentine agriculture and beyond.   
Zero-till technology allows the farmer to lay seed in the ground at the required depth with a 
minimal disturbance of the soil structure.  Specially designed farm machinery eliminates the need for 
plowing and minimizes the tillage required for planting.  The introduction of this cultivation technique in 
the Argentine pampean region generated significant changes throughout the agricultural sector on both 
relevant dimensions: production and productivity and it triggered changes in productive and commercial 
structures well beyond the farm gate.  The adoption of zero-till practices had implications for the national 
economy and, given the substantial role of Argentina’s agricultural production in world markets, for 
global consumers as well.  Table 1 gives an overview of the cumulative impacts. 
Table 1.  Impacts of the adoption of zero-tillage in Argentina 
Land under zero tillage cultivation (2008)  22.3 million (ha) 
Cost reduction for the farmers in Argentina (1991–2008)  $ 4.7 billion (ha) 
Increased gross income of farmers in Argentina (1991–2008)   $12.0 billion (ha) 
Reduction in consumer expenditures Worldwide (1991–2008)  $17.0 billion (ha) 
This paper looks into the process of adaptation and adoption of zero-till agriculture in Argentina, 
addressing the issues raised by these two questions: (i) What factors have contributed to its adoption and 
diffusion by farmers? (ii) What has been the economic and social impacts of this set of changes, both at 
the national and at the world levels? Section two describes the scenario prevailing prior to the 
introduction of zero-till practices.  Section three analyzes the institutional features of the process of 
innovation, as well as the factors behind its development and consolidation.  Section four tells the history 
of zero-till in Argentina.  Sections five and six, as well as the Annex, focus on the impacts of zero-till in 
Argentina and the assessment of its economic benefits both at the national and international levels.  
Section seven presents the conclusions drawn from the study.  
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2.  THE INTRODUCTION OF ZERO-TILL AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES IN 
ARGENTINA  
During the second half of the last century, Argentine agriculture was on a roller coaster.  After an 
extended period of continued growth during the late 1940s and the early 1950s, the country became one 
of the main players in world agricultural markets.  A combination of climatic events and policy changes 
reversed this trend, however, ushering in a period of production and productivity stagnation.  The lack of 
technological innovation during this time has been explained in terms of the incentive structure, as 
farmers minimized the use of commercial inputs as a risk management strategy in a time of 
macroeconomic instability.   
Towards the end of the 1960s and throughout the 1970s, a change in overall conditions marked 
the onset of a new technological cycle, involving the mechanization of agriculture
2
It is in this context that the first soybean varieties adapted for cultivation in the pampean region 
appear.  This region is home to about 65 percent of the country’s population and hosts close to 140 
thousand farms.  It covers an area of about 76 million hectares in the central part of the country (including 
all of the Province of Buenos Aires as well as parts of Córdoba, Entre Ríos, La Pampa, and Santa Fe).  
The region presents a landscape in which undulating plains predominate and it is endowed with a 
temperate climate with 300–1000 mm of rainfall.  It is mostly dedicated to rainfed extensive production 
of cereals and oilseeds, as well as livestock (both beef and dairy) and fruit crops.  In the “green belts” 
around the largest cities, however, farming is much more intensive; in these areas, vegetable crops are the 
most important industry. 
 as well as the use of 
improved seeds.  This development was related to breakthroughs in plant breeding that eventually led to 
significant production and productivity increases.   
Although soybeans had been introduced in Argentina in the early decades of the twentieth 
century, it was only in the late 1950s that a basic package of agronomic practices for the crop was 
developed.  At that point, commercial cultivation of soybeans began to be of some importance.
3
This production scheme led to higher farm incomes, but it also demanded a much tighter 
management schedule to deal with (among other factors) increased climatic risks, higher demands for 
weed control strategies, and more efficient use of farm machinery (Alapín 2008; Senigagliesi and 
Massoni 2002).  This new scenario created additional demand for technical assistance at the farm level to 
manage the relatively unknown crop and the greater complexity of the new cropping systems.  Expertise 
was needed to bring all the parts together in an effective way; access to information and knowledge 
became a key factor in farmers’ success. 
 In later 
years, the continued expansion of international demand for plant protein became the driving force for the 
rapid and sustained adoption of soybean cultivation by local farmers.  Moreover, the introduction of 
soybeans opened up a process of technological change and overall improvement in the organization of 
production, based on a double-cropping scheme, with soybeans following wheat within a single planting 
season. 
 This process resulted in a major shift in agricultural output: grain and oilseed production went up 
by more than 50 percent between the early 1970s and the mid-1990s.  However, the new double-cropping 
system took a considerable toll on soil fertility.  Due to the tightness of planting schedules—by planting 
early in the season, the farmer could minimize the risk of early autumn rains affecting the harvest—the 
usual practice was to burn the stubble of the preceding crop immediately following the harvest.  This 
minimized the fallow period, but it also had a negative effect on soil fertility (through erosion, loss of 
organic matter, and so on).  The practice began to affect productivity negatively, even in the best 
resource-endowed areas.  A 1995 study estimated that about 36 percent of the total area within the region 
showed signs of degradation; in two of the most important river basins of the provinces of Buenos Aires 
                                                       
2 For an in-depth discussion of the evolution of Argentine agricultural production and productivity during the post-World 
War II period, see Barsky 1991 and Manciana 2007. 
3 In fact, the first shipment of Argentine soybeans, destined for Hamburg, took place in July 1962 (Giorda 1997).    
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and Santa Fe (the Arrecifes and Carcaraña basins), soil degradation was as high as 47 percent and 60 
percent, respectively (SAGyP 1995).  This situation recalled the relatively recent episodes of soil erosion 
and productivity decline in the Kazakhstan plains of the USSR, in the early to mid-1960s.  It even brought 
back memories of the 1930s “Dust Bowl” in the United States (that hit Oklahoma, Kansas, Texas, New 
Mexico, and Colorado), when the rapid but technologically inconsistent expansion of the agricultural 
frontier made farming unsustainable, triggering social and economic consequences that are still 
remembered as one of the darkest periods in U.S. agricultural history (Schoijet 2005; Derpsch 1999). 
The growing recognition of the effects of these inadequate soil management practices triggered 
new interest in improved crop management techniques: specifically, a less aggressive approach to soil 
preparation and planting would provide better protection from soil degradation (and the consequent risk 
of diminishing productivity).  The resulting debate also led to an increasing demand for better information 
regarding other countries’ experiences.  Numerous study tours and visits to farm shows were organized, 
for both agricultural scientists and farmers, setting the stage for the development of reduced tillage 
technologies (a predecessor of zero-till), and for the eventual introduction of specialized farm machinery 
for their effective implementation.   
The soil degradation that resulted from the wheat-soybean double-cropping system (and the 
associated practice of burning stubble) thus prompted a change in crop management practices, along with 
an increasing reliance on technical assistance to adapt imported technologies (Alapín 2008: 27).  Public 
sector agricultural researchers, innovative farmers and extension workers—as well as the associated 
manufacturing industries (farm machinery, seeds, and agrochemicals)—-became the core of an innovation 
network.   
This network would play a key role in establishing a new agricultural production strategy based 
on a completely different approach to soil management and conservation: that is, zero-till farming (Ekboir 
2002).  The various participants, both public and private, shared a common perception of the nature of the 
problem as well as a strong interest in solving it, facilitating the generation of knowledge and 
information-sharing within what was at first a rather informal arrangement.  This innovation network 
became a cornerstone of the rapid transformation from stagnation (or even decline) to a rapid and 
sustainable expansion.  Local actors—farmers as well as technical assistance providers—played a key 
role in mobilizing the organizational changes necessary to incorporate the new technologies into existing 
production systems.
4
                                                       
4 Alapín (2008, 31) highlights how farmers participated in mobilizing the process:  
  
Farmers in the Rosario area started to adopt zero-till practices by adapting conventional seeding machines.  Ricardo Ayerza 
adapted a zero-till potato seeder in Saliqueló and Río Cuarto (Province of Córdoba).  In Córdoba there were attempts in the same 
line and, towards the end of the 1960’s, Santos Alzari, a blacksmith in Ascensión in the Junín County, Province of Buenos Aires, 
built, in response to demands from farmers in the area, a seeding machine adapted to the requirements of zero-till agriculture.  
(Authors’ translation.)  
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3.  THE INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF THE INNOVATION PROCESS 
At the international level, concern for resource conservation dates back several decades.  In the United 
States, the Dust Bowl experience of the 1930s prompted the development of reduced-tillage practices to 
improve soil coverage and to promote sustainable productivity growth.  Zero-till technology, however, 
became possible only when 2-4D (a selective herbicide) became available, as weed control was the main 
obstacle in switching from existing tillage practices to the new ones.  Later, more effective herbicides 
(such as Paraquat, released in 1961) enabled further development and widespread adoption of zero-till in 
American agriculture, inducing farm machinery manufacturers to develop new equipment especially 
designed for zero-till.  The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Universities of 
Illinois and Kentucky were the leading research institutions that developed the early zero-till 
technologies; toward the end of the 1970s, they had produced a comprehensive pipeline of innovations—
probably the most advanced in the world at that time.  In the United Kingdom as well, a significant 
amount of work was being done on soil conservation and reduced tillage practices, alongside an active 
adoption process (zero-till reached some 200 thousand ha in 1973).  In Latin America, the first efforts 
were pioneered in Brazil during the 1970s at IPEAME (Instituto de Pesquisas Agropecuarias Meridional, 
which later became the Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuaria, or EMBRAPA), emphasizing the 
adaptation of the new technological concepts to local conditions.
5
Table 2 shows the sequence of events that shaped the development and consolidation of the 
network behind the massive adoption of zero-till practices in Argentina.  The main driving forces were in 
fact individual initiatives: researchers within the National Agricultural Research Systems (NARS), as well 
as universities, farmers and technical assistance providers, all of them motivated by widespread and 
increasing concerns with the sustainability of existing production systems.   
 
As early as 1968, the National Institute of Agricultural Technology (Instituto Nacional de 
Tecnología Agropecuaria, INTA) began to take notice of the soil degradation problems and took steps to 
develop more environmentally friendly cultivation practices.  This effort materialized in an international 
project, FAO/SEAG/INTA/ARG/68/526, designed to establish a soil conservation program that would 
first identify and then discourage the practices that contributed to worsen the problem.  This project also 
played an important role in developing human resources in the field of zero-till agriculture, mainly in 
England
6
These early efforts were followed up in 1986 by a much broader initiative, the Proyecto de 
Agricultura Conservacionista (PAC, the Conservationist Agriculture Project).  This program was aimed at 
developing a response to the already evident land degradation problem—affecting about five million 
hectares of the best farm land—that had resulted from abandoning the traditional crop-livestock rotation 
in favor of intensification schemes.  This initiative was remarkable as it represented a policy statement by 
the largest agricultural research institution in the country, on an issue that was already a main concern of 
both farmers and scientists.  It would eventually provide an institutional framework for a whole range of 
new initiatives.  Within PAC, efforts were made to promote crop management techniques aimed at a more 
sustainable agriculture: a maize-wheat-soybeans rotation; reduced and vertical tilling; nutrient 
replenishment through fertilization (mainly nitrogen and phosphorus); and integrated pest and weed 
management.  It also facilitated the integration and exchange of information among researchers, extension 
staff, private technical assistance providers, farmers, input suppliers, and other related institutions 
(Senigagliesi and Massoni 2002).   
 and the United States, as well as in supporting the introduction of specialized zero-till farm 
machinery (Senigagliesi and Massoni 2002; Alapín 2008).   
Research also went on independently of this institutional effort, both within and outside INTA, by 
scientists, farmers, technical assistance providers and farm equipment manufacturers (Ekboir 2002).  At 
INTA, as early as the mid-1960s, scientists at the Pergamino Experiment Station started to do research on 
                                                       
5 For a more in-depth discussion of these aspects, see Derpsch 1999, 79–97. 
6 In 1974 the United Kingdom was the second country after the United States in total area under zero-till agriculture and was 
a pioneer on research work in the field (Senigagliesi and Massoni 2002).  
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techniques to reduce soil degradation induced by agricultural practices.  This work was later taken up by 
fellow INTA researchers at the Marcos Juarez Experiment Station.  These initiatives were meant to 
address what they perceived as critical problems limiting agricultural production in the areas of influence 
of their respective Experiment Stations.   
Table 2.  Highlights of zero-till technologies development and adoption in Argentine agriculture 
Highlight  Year  Events 
 
1930s 
International awareness of the environmental and social 
consequences of certain agronomic techniques, prompted by “dust 
bowl” in the US  
Key actors in the innovation network 
emerge: farmers, agricultural research 
institutions, researchers and extension 
workers, and the agricultural inputs 
manufacturing industry (farm 
machinery, seeds, and agrochemicals). 
1956 
Creation of the Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria 
(INTA), as part of the international trend to develop national 
institutions that can apply global knowledge resources to local 
problems. 
1961 
Market introduction of the first systemic herbicide (Paraquat, 
developed in 1955).  This led to the intensification of research on 
zero-till practices. 
1968  First local efforts to find solutions to soil degradation problems, 
developed by INTA; not yet directed to zero-till practices. 
1971 
First zero-till experiment in Latin America by the Instituto de 
Pesquisas Agropecuarias Meridional (IPEAME), in Londrina, 
Estado de Paraná, Brazil, with cooperation with GTZ 
mid-1970s  
R & D work on different components of zero-till technology, 
undertaken by individual researchers (INTA), farmers, and 
technical advisers. 
1986  INTA begins to implement the Conservationist Agriculture 
Program (PAC) 
Institutionalization of the innovation 
network  1989  Creation of  the Asociación Argentina de Productores de Siembra 
Directa (AAPRESID, Argentine Association of Zero-Till Farmers) 
Zero-till technology becomes 
increasingly recognized as a 
SUPERIOR alternative to conventional 
tilling 
1990–95  Increasing adoption and consolidation of the innovation network. 
Zero-till adoption rapidly increases to 
become the “industry standard”; 
AAPRESID emerges as a key player in 
the innovation network.   
1996–present  Market introduction of the first genetically modified crop 
(glyphosate-tolerant soybeans). 
Source: The authors, based on cited literature. 
In parallel with these activities, many people did experimental work and shared information: 
farmers, technical assistance providers, and agricultural input and machinery company representatives.  
Researchers from INTA, for example, worked closely with the farm machinery industry for the purpose 
of adaptating zero-till equipment to local conditions, without any formally binding agreements.  This 
informal arrangement played a key role in the development of locally-designed zero-till machinery 
(Ekboir 2002, 7).
7
                                                       
7 In highlighting this interaction among private technical assistance providers and local farm machinery firms, Ekboir states:  
 The expansion of zero-till practices to other crops was similarly initiated through 
Several farmers who had participated in field trials in Marcos Juarez began searching for new sources of information.  For 
example, after a conference by Sherly Philips (University of Kentucky), one of the Rosso brothers traveled to the USA to see 
firsthand what was been done there with regard to zero-till practices and in this trip they realized that for its development to move 
forward, they needed sowing machines, so they contacted Schiarre (a local firm) to develop a prototype.  At about the same time, 
Agrometal, another local farm machinery firm started to work in a collaborative fashion with the Marcos Juarez research group to 
start the development of a local design.  The same type of interaction took place among other firms, farmers and researchers to  
6 
informal channels.  Although most specialists recommended zero-till only for soybeans (as the second 
crop in a double-cropping scheme), a group of farmers and extension workers started trials involving 
other crops, generating the information needed for an even higher adoption of the practice (Ekboir 2002).   
At this point, the area under zero-till cultivation was negligible; the basic concepts and the 
institutional structure that would sustain the coming explosive technological expansion were still being 
established.  The informal emerging network identified problems, tried alternative approaches, and shared 
information about the results.  However, the new approach was still being fine-tuned to local conditions, 
limiting its appeal to farmers.  The situation began to change when glyphosate became commercially 
available in Argentina, greatly facilitating weed control and overcoming the main obstacle to the adoption 
of zero-till technology.
8
In this context, the Asociación Argentina de Productores de Siembra Directa (AAPRESID) was 
created in 1989.  Its founding members were mainly medium- and small-scale farmers and technical 
assistance providers—about twenty people, all of them already involved in the movement to promote 
zero-till agriculture.  The new organization focused on the diffusion and exchange of information 
regarding zero-till practices.  It was set up as an open institution aiming at integrating representatives of 
all of the stakeholders (though only farmers were eligible to serve on its Board of Directors).  The new 
institution grew very rapidly: within two years, the majority of the key players in the agribusiness sector 
had become members.  AAPRESID became the fulcrum around which the development and expansion of 
zero-till has continued to evolve until today.  Beside its mission of promoting and diffusing the new 
technology, AAPRESID also acted as lobbying group for its members, working on such issues as access 
to more favorable bank loans and tax advantages.  For instance, in the 1990s the Province of Santa Fe 
granted tax exemptions for farmers adopting zero-till practices (Alapin 2008). 
 Against the backdrop of farmers’ experience of soil depletion, the availability of 
an effective weed control alternative, along with the implementation of the PAC by INTA, had set the 
stage for the launch of a new zero-till innovation cycle.   
AAPRESID thus became the institutional face of the innovation network supporting zero-till 
development and diffusion in Argentina.  Alapín (2008: 117) summarized AAPRESID’s institutional 
evolution:  
In the time elapsed since its creation, AAPRESID became an actor that 
succeeded in bringing together all the interested parties in promoting the (zero-till) 
technology; and the farmers were, in close interaction with other parties interested in 
promoting the innovation, the ones that captured the benefits of the new knowledge.  
(Translation by the authors). 
                                                                                                                                                                           
improve the design of farm machinery equipment.  (Ekboir 2002, 7. Translation by the authors.) 
8 For an extensive review of the characteristics and impact of glyphosate on the environment and on agriculture in general, 
see Permingeat 2008.  
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4.  EXPANSION AND CONSOLIDATION OF ZERO-TILL PRACTICES IN 
ARGENTINE AGRICULTURE 
Historical Perspective  
Figure 1 shows the evolution in planted area (in grains and oilseeds) for the period 1900–2008.  
Historically, after 35 years of growth, total area peaked in 1935 at 18 million hectares; then began a long 
phase of decadence, hitting bottom in 1952 at 9.5 million hectares.  Agriculture patterns stagnated until 
the mid-seventies; not until 1996 did Argentina get back to 18 million hectares under cultivation, 
although this time around that figure was achieved with a different basket of crops. 
Figure 1.  Historical changes in planted area (1900–2008) 
 
Sources: Ferreres 2005 and SAGPyA 2009. 
The Policy Shift 
Starting at the beginning of the 1990s, the adoption of zero-till practices picked up speed.  Several factors 
contributed to the consolidation of zero-till farming as the standard for grain and oilseed production in 
Argentina:  
•  The new macroeconomic environment of the early 1990s  
•  The introduction of transgenic soybeans crops with herbicide tolerance  
•  The reduction in the price of herbicides 
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8 
Perhaps most significant was the effectiveness of AAPRESID as a consolidated network, 
bringing together all relevant stakeholders to share technical and economic information and to promote 
the benefits of the technology.   
The change in the macroeconomic environment involved the elimination of agricultural 
commodities export taxes and the reduction of import duties on inputs and capital goods.  This, together 
with the deregulation of a number of key markets for goods and services, created favorable conditions for 
the increase of grain and oilseed production, from 26 million tons (1988–89) to over 67 million tons 
(2000–2001).  Soybeans became the main cash crop in the Argentine export basket.   
This expansion took place within a complex international trade environment, with erratic 
agricultural commodity prices and competition from subsidized exports from the OECD countries.  It 
induced both an increase in planted area—at the expense of livestock—and an improvement in crop 
productivity through technological change.  The increase in total planted area may also account for what 
appears to have been a partial reversal in the decades-long process of rural-urban migration, with the 
creation of some 200,000 new jobs in the agricultural sector between 1993 and 1999.
9
The second key factor was the introduction of genetically modified (GM) materials.  The first 
GM crop formally approved for commercial use was glyphosate-tolerant (GT) soybeans, in 1996.  That 
herbicide, specifically adapted for use with zero-till technologies, facilitated the wheat-soybean double-
cropping scheme.  Its price declined dramatically with the expiration of the patent and consequent 
increasing competition from local and foreign manufacturers, helping to consolidate the new production 
trends.   
 
Figure 2.  Evolution of the price of glyphosate and the number of glyphosate-based products 
available in the Argentine market (1994–2001) 
 
Source: Trigo et al.  2002.   
Since it became available to Argentine farmers, the expansion of GT soybeans has been one of 
the major technological events in the country’s agricultural history, with an adoption rate higher than 
other countries (such as Brazil), and even higher than in its original market in the United States (Galvaõ 
Gomes 2008).  In Argentina, GM soybeans went from less than 1 percent of total planted area in 1996–97 
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9 
to virtually 100 percent today (www.argenbio.org).  At the same time, zero-till systems expanded from 
about 300 thousand ha in 1990–91 to more than 22 million ha in 2007–2008 (Figure 2). 
Possibly the most important factor in the expansion of zero-till was a sort of “virtuous 
intensification”: having the potential for environmentally friendly increases in productivity, through 
coupling zero-till planting techniques with herbicide-tolerant soybeans.  The new mechanical 
technologies modified the crop’s interaction with the soil, moderating the impact of cultivation; while the 
new full-range herbicides (with glyphosate in the first place) are environmentally neutral, effectively 
controlling all kinds of weeds without residual environmental effects.  The resulting high factor-intensity 
might be described as a process of “hard” intensification.  However, this hard intensification at the same 
time represents a virtuous intensification, by reducing the use of atrazine, a herbicide whose residual 
action has a negative impact on the environment (see Figure 3).  Even with the increased use of 
agrochemicals, the total use of these products (per hectare of arable land) is still far below that of other 
countries.  The increase in the use of fertilizers during the 1990s was also far below the factor intensity 
levels recorded in other countries, and seems to have stabilized in recent years (Trigo et al.  2002). 
Figure 3.  Evolution of area under zero-till and herbicides used in crop production (1990–2000) 
 
Source: Trigo et al.  2002. 
Soybean is a self-pollinated species; consequently, harvested grain can be used as seeds in 
subsequent plantings without any significant loss of either genetic characteristics or productivity 
potential, for at least two to three years after the initial crop.  This feature has had an impact on the seed 
market and thus on the price of GT soybean seeds.  Under the terms of the 1978 UPOV Convention, 
farmers are allowed to keep grain to use it as seed for their own use, a practice that has led to the 
development of an illegal seed market (the so-called “white bag” soybeans), through which seed 
multipliers also sell uncertified seed of the companies that own the respective intellectual property rights.  
Some estimates place the market share of this illegal seed at 50 percent or more.  This has had a 
significant effect in driving down the price of GT soybean seed, further promoting the rapid adoption of 
GM technology and, indirectly, that of zero tillage practices (Costamagna 2004).  But on the downside, 
these illegal markets can be a disincentive to companies who conduct research and development (R&D) 
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All the factors discussed above help to explain the current dominance of zero-till practices 
throughout the Argentine grain and oilseed production structure.  During the last three decades, all the 
contributing factors have come together: the initial concerns with diminishing soil fertility; new 
knowledge of how to improve it; the inputs necessary to implement the new technologies (seeds, 
herbicides, and machinery); the social networks to promote information-sharing; and an adequate policy 
environment.  The end result can be defined as a “win-win” outcome, with positive economic and 
environmental benefits for both Argentine farmers and world consumers.   
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5.  THE IMPACTS OF ZERO-TILL TECHNOLOGY 
The remarkable expansion of total area planted with grains and oilseeds that took place in Argentina 
during the period 1971–2008
10
Figure 4.  Expansion of cropped area (1971–2008)  
 represented almost a threefold increase, from roughly 11 million to 30 
million ha (see Figure 4).  This period was marked by several milestones. 
 
Source: SAGPyA 2009. 
Beginning in 1991, this significant trend was closely associated with the high rate of adoption of 
zero-till technology, effectively adapted to local conditions (see Figure 5).  The expansion of one 
particular crop, soybeans, played a pivotal role in this process (see Figure 6).  The following section 
assesses the impacts of this expansion, separating out the effects of zero-till from other technologies (such 
as GM soybeans); detailed computations appear as an annex. 
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Figure 5.  Area under no-till production (1971–2008) 
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Figure 6.  Area with soybeans (1971–2008) 
 
Source: SAGPyA 2009. 
Some of the effects of the adoption of this technological package are difficult to assess and 
quantify, as they are related to improvements in the quality of the soil, a key natural resource for 
agriculture.  There is ample empirical evidence related to this particular issue: lower rates of depletion of 
organic matter, higher moisture-holding capacity, and a consequent reduction (or even reversal) of 
decades-long degradation processes have been reported (Casas 2003; De Moraes Sá et al.  2004; 
Andriulo, Sasal, and Rivero 2001; Zaccagnini and Calamar 2001; Sagardoy et al.  2001). 
The adoption of zero-till technologies has had other measurable impacts, in terms of changes in 
income flows of Argentine farmers and as improvements in the purchasing power of global consumers.  
These two kinds of outcomes—the measurable economic impacts and the less-measurable physical 
ones—are probably mutually reinforcing.   
There is currently an ongoing debate, however, regarding the nature and magnitude of potentially 
negative impacts of zero-till on the structure of the soils in more marginal areas.  These are areas 
previously not suited for cultivation, that have experienced a major shift in farming systems from (more 
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6.  ESTIMATION OF BENEFITS   
In this study we will attempt to define the nature and magnitude of the positive impacts of zero-till 
technology in Argentina, taking into account two dimensions: (i) the supply side, that is, benefits to 
producers in Argentina; and (ii) the demand side, in terms of benefits to consumers worldwide. 
The Supply Side: Benefits to Producers  
We assume that the measurable benefits to producers during the period under analysis came from two 
sources: the supply shock (above-trend expansion of planted area); and the savings in production costs 
generated by a reduction in factor use intensity.  Both are the result of farmers’ adoption of zero-till 
practices.  Details of the methodological approach and actual computations are presented as an annex.  
The results of these estimations are presented in the following two sections. 
Benefits to Farmers from the Supply Shock 
Table 3 presents the benefits to farmers measured as the increase in gross income associated with the 
expansion of the planted area in soybeans and maize.  Those benefits have been remarkable: about 8.3 
percent of the total value of these two crops in 2008 is attributable to zero-till induced supply shock; and 
the cumulative impact is estimated at $12 billion by 2008.   
Table 3.  Supply shock: value of additional production of soybeans and maize (1991–2008) 
Year 
Argentina: Zero-Till Induced Supply Shock  
Total Value Of Production Of The Additional Output Of Soybeans + Maize   
(Million US current dollars; 1991–2008) 
Soybeans  Maize  S + M  % of TVP due to zero-till shock 
1991  31  16  47  1.5 
1992  62  36  98  2.8 
1993  93  54  148  4.0 
1994  121  72  193  4.9 
1995  151  107  258  6.1 
1996  229  148  377  7.2 
1997  227  138  365  7.2 
1998  304  190  494  8.0 
1999  245  173  418  8.7 
2000  278  178  455  8.7 
2001  310  197  507  8.5 
2002  397  271  668  9.0 
2003  552  325  877  8.9 
2004  526  355  881  8.8 
2005  600  379  979  9.1 
2006  637  447  1,083  9.6 
2007  1,020  787  1,807  9.7 
2008  1,473  898  2,371  9.3 
1991–2008  7,255  4,773  12,027  8.3% 
Source: Cap 2009, based on SAGPyA 2009.  
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Benefits to Farmers from Lower Production Costs 
As a side effect of the transformation of soybean cultivation, important crops such as sunflower and 
wheat (as well as others) also showed significant rates of adoption of zero-till practices (Figure 7).  For 
these crops, however, there was no concurrent growth in cultivated area; in fact, sunflower cropping 
evolved in the opposite direction.  Nevertheless, the new technology brought about a positive change in 
the cost structure for all crops; these savings can be counted as an innovation-induced benefit to farmers. 
Figure 7.  Area under no-till, by crop (1991–2008) 
 
Source:  AAPRESID 2007; Cap 2009, based on AAPRESID 2007 and SAGPyA 2009. 
The savings benefit to producers is defined as the cumulative savings from lower costs of land 
cultivation and crop production from zero-till practices.  These savings have been estimated at 1.5 UTA 
(Agricultural Tilling Unit).
11
                                                       
11 Márgenes Agropecuarios 2009.  UTA is the acronym for Agricultural Tilling Unit, an index that compiles the average cost 
of inputs and labor needed to crop one hectare of farmland, from land preparation to harvest.   
  With a total of almost 179 million ha planted under zero-till since 1991, the 
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Figure 8.  Total area under no-till 
 
Source: AAPRESID 2007 and Cap 2009. 
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Table 4.  Cumulative savings from zero-till 
YEAR  Argentina: Area under zero-till* 
(ha) 
UTA Annual Averages** 
(USD/ha) 
Total Cumulative Savings 
(M USD) 
1991  300,000  17.37  7.8 
1992  500,000  16.87  12.7 
1993  970,000  14.86  21.6 
1994  1,810,000  14.86  40.4 
1995  2,440,000  15.72  57.5 
1996  2,970,000  17.55  78.2 
1997  3,950,100  19.02  112.7 
1998  5,000,000  19.20  144.0 
1999  7,269,500  19.20  209.3 
2000  9,250,000  19.21  266.5 
2001  11,660,000  19.07  333.6 
2002  15,000,821  11.21  252.2 
2003  16,351,212  15.18  372.4 
2004  18,496,446  15.65  434.3 
2005  19,683,172  16.09  475.1 
2006  19,719,436  15.99  473.0 
2007  21,110,471  19.63  621.5 
2008  22,348,159  23.74  795.9 
1991–2008  178,829,316  17.25  4,708.6 
*Source: AAPRESID 2007 and Cap 2009. 
**Source: AACREA 2009. 
Benefits to Consumers 
The benefits to consumers were estimated indirectly, from the price effect of the increase in agricultural 
output.  Zero-till technology in Argentina is associated with two internationally-traded feed grains, 
soybeans and maize.  Soybean production is almost entirely (95 percent) exported.   
We estimate the accumulated savings by consumers worldwide for the period between 1991 (the initial 
adoption of zero-till practices in Argentina) and 2008.  (See Annex Tables A1 and A2 for details of the 
methodological approach and actual computations for soybeans and maize.) A summary of the results is 
presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5.  Change in consumer expenditures on soybeans and maize from adoption of zero-till 
(1991–2008)  
YEAR  SOYBEANS  MAIZE  S + M 
1991  -39  -27  -66 
1992  -77  -60  -137 
1993  -117  -91  -207 
1994  -151  -120  -272 
1995  -188  -179  -367 
1996  -286  -247  -533 
1997  -284  -230  -514 
1998  -380  -317  -697 
1999  -306  -288  -595 
2000  -347  -296  -643 
2001  -387  -329  -716 
2002  -496  -451  -948 
2003  -690  -542  -1,232 
2004  -658  -591  -1,249 
2005  -750  -632  -1,382 
2006  -796  -744  -1,540 
2007  -1,275  -1,311  -2,586 
2008  -1,841  -1,496  -3,337 
1991–2008  -9,069  -7,954  -17,023 
Source: Cap 2009. 
Note: All figures are million current U.S.  dollars.   
Total Benefits 
Table 6 presents a summary of total estimated benefits, based on the estimates presented in the previous 
section.  The total estimated benefits derived from zero-till practices in Argentina amount to $33.76 
billion, including impacts on both production and consumption.  On the supply side, these benefits (over 
the 1991–2008 period) include some $12 billion worth of additional gross income, and $4.71 billion 
worth of savings attributed to the reduction in operating costs for Argentina’s farmers.  On the demand 
side, $17.02 billion was saved by consumers worldwide, as an effect of lower market prices for both 
agricultural commodities. 
Table 6.  Summary of impacts of zero-till in Argentina (1991–2008)  
Increased gross income of farmers in Argentina  12.03 
Cost reduction for farmers in Argentina  4.71 
Reduction in consumer expenditures worldwide  17.02 
Total  33.76 
Note: All figures are billion current US dollars. 
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Note that the benefits computed for the supply side are likely overestimated.  Other technologies 
involved in the production process (such as improved varieties, new inputs, and more efficient 
management) have a share in the impact that is difficult to separate out.  Moreover, the estimate does not 
take into account the value of the forfeited production that was displaced (mostly low productivity 
livestock production), a value that is difficult to assess owing to the high heterogeneity of the 
agroecological and microeconomic parameters.  Nevertheless, the magnitudes involved would probably 
withstand any sensitivity analysis performed on the results.  Even if the results on the supply side were 
overestimated by as much as fifty percent, total benefits would be reduced by just 23 percent, from $33.76 
billion to $26 billion—still a very significant figure.  
20 
7.  CONCLUSION 
The results presented in this study tell an impressive success story, centered on the set of technologies that 
came to be known as zero-till farming.  These technological innovations were initially conceived to 
internalize the negative externalities induced by conventional tillage by reversing the damage to the 
physical and chemical structure of the soil, thus addressing a threat to the long-term sustainability of 
agricultural production. 
According to the estimates presented in this paper, a total of $33.76 billion—in savings and 
additional earnings—can be attributed to this set of innovations, as developed and adapted for Argentina’s 
agroecological conditions and effectively adopted by Argentine farmers.  These are measurable, positive 
impacts of the development, adaptation, diffusion, and adoption of a specific set of agricultural 
production technologies.   
Beyond the quantitative story is the story of the social process that brought about the 
transformation.  A very diverse set of stakeholders—farmers, research institutions, technical assistance, 
and the agricultural inputs and farm machinery industry—came together as an innovation network.  Their 
work evolved from the identification of the problem to the development of the technical alternatives, 
generating not only an information exchange mechanism but also the microeconomic conditions and the 
policy environment to support the process of change throughout its entire cycle.     
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APPENDIX: MEDTHODOLOGICAL NOTES AND CALCULATIONS 
Estimation of the Benefits to Farmers 
The Supply Shock 
Since the onset of the zero-till era in 1991, marked by the first 300 thousand ha of crops using that 
technology, total area in grains and oilseeds rapidly doubled from 15 to 30 million ha.  It is quite possible 
that, if this technology had not been made available to farmers, total cultivated area would have remained 
at the initial level (15 million ha); in fact, total planted area had been virtually stagnant for roughly the 
preceding decade, from 1983 to 1993 (see Figure A1).   
Figure A1.  Area in grains and oilseeds showing stagnant decade (1983–93) 
 
Source: SAGPyA 2009. 
The Impact on Soybean Production.  The stock of land suitable to be planted with soybeans has increased 
in two distinct ways: the expansion of the agricultural frontier into marginal areas previously not suited to 
this crop; and the increase in double-cropping (sowing soybeans right after wheat is harvested).  Double-
cropping constitutes a sort of “virtual” expansion of the stock of arable land, since the same plot is 
utilized twice in one year.  This applies to the entire 1991–2008 period (see Figure A1), but especially to 
the period beginning in 1997, with the introduction of GT soybeans. 
The history of zero-till and the expansion of crop area in Argentina consists of two stages.  The 
first stage covers the period 1991–97.  Note, however, that the diffusion of the zero-till technological 
package in fact had its beginnings in the late 1970s; by 1991, the expansion of soybeans was already 
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Figure A2.  Argentina: Area with soybeans (1971-1991) 
 
Source: SAGPyA 2009. 
The period between 1991 (the start of the adoption in a significant scale of zero-till) and 1998 
shows an even faster expansion of the area planted with soybeans, at 336 thousand ha/year (see Figure 
A3). 
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Figure A3.  Argentina: Area with soybeans (1992-1998) 
 
Source: SAGPyA 2009. 
The second stage (1997–2008) evolved from the release in 1996 of GT soybeans for commercial 
use in Argentina (almost simultaneous with its release in the United States).  This triggered an 
acceleration of the rate of expansion of the area planted with soybeans—in fact, almost tripling it.  These 
two technologies, zero-till and GT soybeans, implemented as one package, became a most effective 
combination.  For the 1997–2008 period, the area with soybeans trended upwards at a rate of 977 
thousand ha/year (see Figure A4). 
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Figure A4.  Argentina: Area with soybeans (1997-2008) 
 
Source: SAGPyA (2009) 
For the purpose of this study, it was assumed that the pure effect of zero-till on soybean planted 
area is effectively captured by the difference between the expansion rate during the period 1992–98 (336 
thousand ha/year) and that of the previous period, 1971–91 (272 thousand ha/year).  The result comes to 
some 64 thousand ha/year. 
It was further assumed that, if the GT soybean varieties had not been released commercially in 
1996, these 64 thousand hectares/year would have been added to the stock of land planted with soybeans 
from 1997 to 2008, as an effect of the continuing adoption of zero-till practices by farmers (net of the 
synergy effect of the zero-till + GT soybeans technological package).   
The Impact on Maize Production.  As mentioned above, soybean cultivation was initially adopted in 
Argentina in the late 1960s, but the area planted became worthy of statistical attention only in 1971, when 
it reached 37.7 thousand hectares.  From that point until 1991, the evolution of soybean and maize 
cultivation mirrored one another (see Figure A5): the increase in soybeans was, for the most part, in 
substitution for maize.   
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Figure A5.  Argentina: Area with soybeans and maize (1971-2008) 
 
Source: SAGPyA (2009). 
The trend for maize for the period 1971–91 was clearly downward, at a rate of about 88 thousand 
ha/year (see Figure A6).  In 1992, however, there was a significant break in trend, turning upward at a 
rate of 38 thousand ha/year, considering the rest of the period under study (see Figure A7).  The date 1992 
coincides with the time when the area under zero-till became substantial, at 300 thousand.  It appears 
reasonable, therefore, to link this change with the new technology.  The additional supply generated by 
this expanded area is assumed to represent a benefit to the suppliers (farmers and others in the value 























Figure A6.  Argentina: Area with maize (1971-1991) 
 
Source: SAGPyA 2009. 
Figure A7.  Argentina: Area with maize (1992-2008) 
 
Source: SAGPyA 2009. 
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The Estimation of Benefits to Consumers 
Supply price-elasticity is a parameter that quantifies the ΔQ/Δp relationship.  The elasticity formula 
represents the expected change in the volume supplied by farmers (ΔQ) as a fraction of a change in the 
price of the commodity (Δp)—as known to farmers when they make the decision to plant.  For example, a 
supply price-elasticity of 0.7 means that, for each 1 percent change in the price, supply will respond with 
a change of 0.7 percent in the same direction (that is, supply goes up if the price is higher, and goes down 
if the price drops).  The supply price elasticities of soybeans and maize are useful parameters to describe 
the producer’s responses to changes in market signals.  But we lack a corresponding formula to assess the 
changes in quantities and quality of the basket of food items purchased at the household level, as an effect 
of a supply shock for specific agricultural commodities.  It is true that such demand functions and 
parameters are routinely estimated for poultry, pork, beef, and other animal products; nevertheless, for the 
consumer household demand price elasticities of soybeans and maize, taken as pure commodities, such an 
approach is simply not feasible. 
The inverse of the elasticity ratio—that is, Δp/ΔQ—is called flexibility, and it measures the 
response of the price to changes in the volume supplied.  Econometricians warn, however, about the error 
of taking the estimated value of elasticity, reversing it, and working with the resulting number as if it were 
an accurate estimation of flexibility.  With this caveat, we decided to use, for soybeans, the inverse of an 
estimation of its supply price-elasticity for the United States, the world’s biggest producer.  That figure 
has been estimated at 0.80 (with other estimates ranging from 0.22 to 0.92).  If we assume our figure 
represents the real value of the parameter instead of an estimation, its inverse (1.25) could be considered 
as the real price-flexibility ratio.  If our assumption holds, we can estimate the effect on the world price of 
soybeans of the additional supply originating in Argentina, attributable to the expansion of area planted 
induced by the adoption of zero-till practices.   
For maize, we assumed that its supply price-elasticity stands at 0.6 and that the inverse (1.67) 
represents an accurate estimation of its price flexibility. 
Price flexibility of supply of these feed grains was thus considered the best available parameter to 
assess, in an indirect manner, the impact of the supply shock that took place in Argentina.  That impact 
includes not only the impact on the "world price" of the commodity but also, indirectly, on prices of any 
consumer products that include those commodities (either as a component or as an input along the value 
chain), valued at the observed world price.   
The estimates of the impact on consumers of the supply shock of soybeans and maize are 
presented in Tables A1 and A2 respectively. 
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Table A1.  Argentina: Soybeans impact on prices of supply shock from zero-till 
Year 
Soybeans World Total 
Production * 
(T) 












1991  103,313,555  144,524  214  -0.17%  -39 
1992  114,454,684  291,140  212  -0.32%  -77 
1993  115,157,925  411,444  227  -0.45%  -117 
1994  136,466,904  518,032  234  -0.47%  -151 
1995  126,985,270  649,437  232  -0.64%  -188 
1996  130,216,631  802,376  285  -0.77%  -286 
1997  144,419,660  765,393  297  -0.66%  -284 
1998  160,105,220  1,368,971  222  -1.07%  -380 
1999  157,806,336  1,397,905  175  -1.11%  -306 
2000  161,409,973  1,480,945  187  -1.15%  -347 
2001  177,925,727  1,806,145  172  -1.27%  -387 
2002  181,913,593  2,005,193  198  -1.38%  -496 
2003  190,766,963  2,315,213  238  -1.52%  -690 
2004  205,483,881  1,963,270  268  -1.19%  -658 
2005  214,244,613  2,600,198  231  -1.52%  -750 
2006  222,403,973  2,723,289  234  -1.53%  -796 
2007  216,144,262  3,208,724  318  -1.86%  -1,275 
2008  220,840,000  3,227,449  456  -1.83%  -1,841 
1991–2008          -9,069 
Source: By the authors, based on FAO 2009, USDA 2009, and SAGPyA 2009. 
* FAOSTAT; USDA 2009. 
** FOB prices, Argentine Ports.  SAGPyA 2009. 
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Table A2.  Argentina: Maize impact on prices of supply shock from zero-till 
Year 
Maize World Total 
Production * 
(T) 













1991  494,382,299  152,179  107  -0.05  -27 
1992  533,586,136  340,425  106  -0.11  -60 
1993  476,769,833  491,614  111  -0.17  -91 
1994  568,621,643  637,725  113  -0.19  -120 
1995  517,326,996  850,798  126  -0.27  -179 
1996  589,457,456  912,014  163  -0.26  -247 
1997  586,066,202  1,199,931  115  -0.34  -230 
1998  615,190,988  1,829,562  104  -0.50  -317 
1999  607,946,092  1,818,571  95  -0.50  -288 
2000  592,519,009  2,044,234  87  -0.58  -296 
2001  615,335,892  2,257,929  87  -0.61  -329 
2002  603,043,200  2,744,841  99  -0.76  -451 
2003  644,885,428  3,168,101  103  -0.82  -542 
2004  728,076,771  3,367,724  105  -0.77  -591 
2005  715,813,543  4,153,308  91  -0.97  -632 
2006  699,285,375  3,553,775  126  -0.85  -744 
2007  784,786,580  4,903,334  160  -1.04  -1,311 
2008  790,910,000  4,370,187  205  -0.92  -1,496 
1991–2008          -7,954 
Source: Cap 2009. 
* FAOSTAT; USDA 2009. 
** FOB prices, Argentine Ports.  SAGPyA 2009.  
  30 
REFERENCES 
Alapin, H. 2008. Rastrojos y algo más: Historia de la siembra directa en Argentina.. Buenos Aires: Editorial Teseo. 
Andriulo, A., C. Sasal, and M. L Rivero. 2001. Los sistemas de producción conservacionistas como mitigadores de 
la pérdida de carbono orgánico edáfico. In Siembra Directa II. Argentina: Nacional de Tecnología 
Agropecuaria (INTA). 
Barsky, O., ed. 1991. El desarrollo agropecuario pampeano. Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano. 
Casas, R. 2003. El aumento de la materia orgánica en suelos argentinos: el aporte de la siembre directa. In XI 
Congreso Nacional de AAPRESID, Darse Cuenta. Rosario, Argentina: AAPRESID. 
Costamagna, O. 2004. Mercado de semillas—Impacto del proyecto de fondo fiduciario (Regalías Globales). Foro de 
Perspectiva Agroindustrial 2004, Seminario Outlook de la Agroindustria Argentina: El campo como 
eje de la sociedad argentina. San José, Costa Rica: Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on 
Agriculture (IICA).  
De Moraes Sá, J. C., C. Cerri, M. Piccolo, B. Feigl, L. Seguy, S. Bouzinac, S. Venzke-Filho, and M. Neto. 2004. 
Acumulo de materia organica no solo em plantio direto como o pasar dos anos. In XII Congreso de 
AAPRESID. Rosario, Argentina: AAPRESID. 
Derpsch, R. 1999. Expansión mundial de la siembra directa y avances tecnológicos. Proceedings, 7° Congreso 
Nacional de Siembra Directa de AAPRESID, Mar del Plata, August 17–20. Rosario, Argentina: 
AAPRESID. 
Ekboir, J., ed. 2002. CIMMYT 2000–2001: World wheat overview and outlook—Developing no-till packages for 
small-scale farmers. Mexico: International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT). 
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2009. FAOSTAT statistical database. 
<http://faostat.fao.org/>. Accessed April 23, 2009. 
Ferreres, O. J. 2005. Dos siglos de economía argentina (1810–2004): Historia argentina en cifras. Buenos Aires: El 
Ateneo. 
Freeman, C., and C. Pérez. 1988. Crisis estructural de ajuste, ciclos económicos y comportamiento de la inversión. 
In Ciencia, tecnología y crecimiento económico, eds. C. Francois and J. C. Neffa. Buenos Aires: 
Trabajo y Sociedad. 
Galvão Gomes, A. 2008. Benefícios Econômicos da Biotecnologia no Brasil “O caso da soja RR.” Céleres. 
<http://www.celeres.com.br/SumarioExecutivoBeneficioEconomico_SojaRR29.01.08.pdf>. Accessed 
August 1, 2009. 
Giorda, L. 1997. La soja en la Argentina. INTA, Centro Regional Córdoba.  
Huang, K. 2006. A look at food price elasticities and flexibilities. Poster Paper for 26
th Conference of the 
International Association of Agricultural Economists, August 12-18. Gold Coast, Queensland, 
Australia.  
Manciana, E., ed. 2007. El campo a fines del siglo XX: Intentos, fracasos y las políticas que vienen. FORGES, 
Buenos Aires.  
Márgenes Agropecuarios. 2009. Year 24, No. 285. Buenos Aires.  
Neffa, J. 2000. Las Innovaciones científicas y tecnológicas (una introducción a su economía política). Buenos Aires: 
Asociación Trabajo y Sociedad, CEIL-PIETTE-CONICET, Lúmen/Humanitas. 
Permingeat, H. 2008. Los organismos vegetales geneticamente modificados (OVGMs) y el ambiente. Prospectiva 
Tecnológica (Número Especial). Buenos Aires: AAPRESID. 
Sábato, J. 1971. Ciencia, tecnología, desarrollo y dependencia. Serie Mensajes. San Miguel de Tucumán: 
Universidad Nacional de Tucumán.  
  31 
Sagardoy, M. A., H. E. Gómez, F. A. Montero, C. Zoratti, and A. R. Quiroga. 2001. Influencia del sistema de 
siembra diecta sobre los microorganismos del suelo. In Siembra Directa II. Argentina: Nacional de 
Tecnología Agropecuaria (INTA). 
Schoijet, M. 2005. Desertificación y tormentas de arena. Revista Región y Sociedad 17 (32): 167–187. 
SAGyP (Secretaria De Agricultura, Ganaderia Y Pesca). 1995. El deterioro de las tierras en la República 
Argentina: Alerta amarillo. Buenos Aires: SAGyP. 
SAGPyA (Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Pesca y Alimentos). 2009. Precios FOB, Puertos Argentinos. 
<http://www.sagpya.mecon.gov.ar>. Accessed April 23, 2009.  
Senigagliesi, C., and S. Massoni. 2002. Transferencia de tecnología en Siembra Directa: Un análisis de lo realizado 
en el INTA. In Siembra Directa II. Argentina: Nacional de Technologia Agropecuaria (INTA). 
Trigo, E., D. Chudnovsky, E. Cap, and A. López. 2002. Los transgénicos en la agricultura Argentina: Una historia 
con final abierto. Libros del Zorzal. San José, Costa Rica: Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on 
Agriculture (IICA). 
USDA (United States Department of Agriculture). World agricultural supply and demand estimates report: 
(WASDE 469), April 9, 2009. <http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/waob/wasde//2000s/2009/wasde-
04-09-2009.pdf>. Accessed April 23, 2009. 
Zaccagnini, M. E., and N. C. Calamar. 2001. Labranzas conservacionistas, siembra directa y biodiversidad. In 




  32 
IFPRI DISCUSSION PAPERS 
Prepared for the “Millions Fed: Proven Successes in Agricultural Development” 
910.  Combating stem and leaf rust of wheat: Historical perspective, impacts, and lessons learned.  H.  J.  Dubin and John P.  
Brennan, 2009.  
911.  The Asian Green Revolution.  Peter B.  R.  Hazell, 2009. 
912.  Controlling cassava mosaic virus and cassava mealybug in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Felix Nweke, 2009. 
913.  Community forestry in Nepal: A policy innovation for local livelihoods.  Hemant Ojha, Lauren Persha, and Ashwini 
Chhatre, 2009. 
914.  Agro-environmental transformation in the Sahel:  Another kind of “Green Revolution.”  Chris Reij, Gray Tappan, and 
Melinda Smale, 2009. 
915.  The case of zero-tillage technology in Argentina.  Eduardo Trigo, Eugenio Cap, Valeria Malach, and Federico Villarreal, 
2009. 
916.  Zero tillage in the rice-wheat systems of the Indo-Gangetic plains: A review of impacts and sustainability implications.  
Olaf Erenstein, 2009. 
917.  The impact of shallow tubewells and boro rice on food security in Bangladesh.  Mahabub Hossain, 2009. 
918.  Hybrid rice technology development: Ensuring China’s food security.  Jiming Li, Yeyun Xin, and Longping Yuan, 2009. 
919.  Pearl millet and sorghum improvement in India.  Carl E.  Pray and Latha Nagarajan, 2009. 
920.  Institutional reform in the Burkinabè cotton sector and its impacts on incomes and food security: 1996–2006.  Jonathan 
Kaminski, Derek Headey, and Tanguy Bernard, 2009. 
921.  Private sector responses to public investments and policy reforms: The case of fertilizer and maize market development in 
Kenya.  Joshua Ariga and T.  S.  Jayne, 2009. 
922.  The mungbean transformation: Diversifying crops, defeating malnutrition.  Subramanyan Shanmugasundaram, J.  D.  H.  
Keatinge, and Jacqueline d’Arros Hughes, 2009. 
923.  The global effort to eradicate rinderpest.  Peter Roeder and Karl Rich, 2009. 
924.  Rural and urban linkages: Operation Flood’s role in India’s dairy development.  Kenda Cunningham, 2009. 
925.  Rich food for poor people: Genetically improved tilapia in the Philippines.  Sivan Yosef, 2009. 
926.  “Crossing the river while feeling the rocks:” Incremental land reform and its impact on rural welfare in China.  John W.  
Bruce and Zongmin Li, 2009. 
927.  Land-tenure policy reforms: Decollectivization and the Doi Moi System in Vietnam.  Michael Kirk and Tuan Nguyen, 
2009. 
928.  Improving diet quality and micronutrient nutrition: Homestead food production in Bangladesh.  Lora Iannotti, Kenda 
Cunningham, and Marie Ruel, 2009. 
929.  Improving the proof: Evolution of and emerging trends in impact assessment methods and approaches in agricultural 







For all discussion papers, please go to www.ifpri.org/pubs/pubs.htm#dp. 
All discussion papers can be downloaded free of charge. 
  
 




2033 K Street, NW 




IFPRI ADDIS ABABA 
P.  O.  Box 5689 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
Tel.: +251 11 6463215 
Fax: +251 11 6462927 
Email: ifpri-addisababa@cgiar.org 
IFPRI NEW DELHI 
CG Block, NASC Complex, PUSA 
New Delhi 110-012 India 
Tel.: 91 11 2584-6565 
Fax: 91 11 2584-8008 / 2584-6572 
Email: ifpri-newdelhi@cgiar.org 